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I. ST. AL'S ARGUMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTING PARTNER SHARE 
ARE CONFUSING AND CONTRARY TO LAW. 
St. AI's begins its briefby discussing its departing partner share. St. AI's initially tries to 
short-circuit the analysis by erroneously contending that this Court is powerless to consider this 
issue since it is res judicata. Cross-Respondents' Brief at 1-2. In a nutshell, St. AI's argues that 
MRIA did not appeal Judge McLaughlin's previous finding related to St. AI's departing partner 
share, and therefore is barred from doing so now by the law-of-the-case doctrine. This position 
ignores the nature of what MRlA is contending. Its sole argument here is that Judge 
McLaughlin's holding related to Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement was 
implicitly reversed by the SADC decision. See 148 Idaho 479, 224 P .3d 1068, 1074-80 (2009). 
Obviously, MRIA could not have pointed out the inconsistency between Judge McLaughlin's 
holding and the SADC decision until this Court did, in fact, issue the SADC decision. 
Indeed, because the issue here is whether SADC impliedly overruled Judge McLaughlin's 
ruling, it does not make any legal difference whether MRIA could or should have brought the 
issue up in the previous trial or appeal, since an implicit reversal, standing alone, is a well 
recognized exception to the law of the case doctrine. As one appellate court noted: 
[W]e implicitly reversed the underlying basis ofthe decision striking the 
affirmative defense when we held that the Quatemans were bound to provide 
those documents. Thus, this case falls within the recognized exception to the law-
of-the-case doctrine that applies where a higher reviewing court, subsequent to the 
lower court's decision, makes a contrary ruling on the same issue. 
Burke v. Quateman, 2012 WL 6962865, *9 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 2012) (emphasis added); see also, 
e.g., Atlantic Mut. Ins. v. Palisades Safety & Ins., 2003 WL 22100231, *4 (N.l Super. A.D. 
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2003) (" ... the earlier finding was implicitly reversed. The "law of the case doctrine" did not 
mmJy ... ") (emphasis added); see also State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000) 
("The general rule is that, on remand, a trial court has authority to take actions it is specifically 
directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate court.") 
(emphasis added). Put more simply, if this Court finds that its ruling in SADC did, in fact, have 
the effect of reversing Judge McLaughlin's departing-partnership-share decision, then the law-
of-the-case doctrine is inapposite-making the timeliness of the argument entirely moot. 
St. AI's next engages in some confusing mental gymnastics in order to convince the 
Court of the facially-dubious argument that Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement 
allow for dissociation for any reason, but then are somehow restrictive when it comes to the 
buyout amount, in spite of no explicit language in the contract indicating as much. St. AI's 
cardinal misstatement in this regard is that "Judge McLaughlin's buyout decision did not depend 
at all on his wrongful dissociation ruling." Cross-Respondents' Brief at 3. As it turns out, Judge 
McLaughlin's opinion repeatedly states the exact opposite. A review of his decision and the 
contract he was interpreting is accordingly warranted. 
The language of the contract as it relates to the buyout is actually quite expansive, when 
read alone: "Unless otherwise agreed, the withdrawing Hospital Partner shall only be entitled to 
receive for its interest in the Partnership an amount which is equal to the balance of such 
Hospital Partner's capital account at the time of withdrawal." Ex. 4023, § 6.1. Notably, there is 
nothing in this sentence referring to the reason for the withdrawal; left to itself, this sentence 
would apply the buyout to any withdrawal any partner might effectuate for any reason. 
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But Judge McLaughlin decided that he could not read this language into every 
withdrawal because it was found in the context of Article 6.1, which he believed spoke only to 
"rightful" withdrawal for a handful of medical and theological reasons. 2007 R. 2309-11. Judge 
McLaughlin accordingly held that because Article 6.1 only allowed for a "rightful" withdrawal 
for these specific medical and theological reasons, the buyout should be limited to these reasons 
as well: "The Court has further examined the type of circumstances outlined in Article 6.1 as 
permitted reasons for dissociation. . .. The Court finds that considering ... the language of the 
Partnership Agreement itself, the applicability of the buyout calculation in Article 6.1 is limited 
to those enumerated four (4) reasons for dissociation, which did not occur in this case." Id. 
(emphasis added). Put more simply, Judge McLaughlin found that because there were only four 
sets of circumstances allowing for "rightful" withdrawal, there were also only four sets of 
circumstances in which the buyout provision could be triggered. 
Of course, this Court has since found the contrary-that Article 6.1 is not limited to 
"those enumerated four (4) reasons for dissociation." SADC, 224 P.3d at 1074-80; 2007 R. 
2309-11. Thus, the very reason Judge McLaughlin stated he was limiting the buyout to just the 
enumerated medical-theological reasons-i.e., because they were the only "permitted reasons for 
dissociation"-was entirely removed. As such, a reversal as to one was a reversal as to the other. 
St. AI's nonetheless maintains that Judge McLaughlin intended his decision as an 
affirmation that St. AI's "dissociated pursuant to its power granted by RUPA." Cross-
Respondents' Brief at 3. But whether RUPA applies or not does not change the analysis here, 
since RUP A is, by its own terms, nothing more than a contractual gap filler. RUP A states clearly 
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that except in a few very specific instances, "relations among the partners and between the 
partners and the partnership are governed bv the Partnership Agreement." I.C. § 53-3-103 
(emphasis added); see also Horne v. Aune, 130 Wash. App. 183, 121 P.3d 1227, 1235 (Wash. 
App. 2005) ("RUP A is a 'gap filler' in that it only governs partnership affairs to the extent not 
otherwise agreed to by the partners in the Partnership Agreement."). Thus, if the Partnership 
Agreement states that the buyout upon any withdrawal is to be limited the departing partner's 
capital account-as is the only possible interpretation in the wake of this Court's SADC 
decision-then RUP A would dictate that this language controls. 
Finally, St. AI's argues that Judge McLaughlin's policy reasons concerning limiting the 
buyout to the four "enumerated reasons" in Article 6.1 are sound. Yet this again ignores that 
Judge McLaughlin specifically found that these policy rationales justified not just limiting the 
buyout to the "four enumerated reasons," but also why "rightful" dissociation should be limited 
to these same reasons: 
The Court has further examined the type of circumstances outlined in Article 6.1 
as permitted reasons for dissociation. Each of these circumstances were subject to 
changes in law or medical-theological circumstances of the Hospital partners that 
could require that hospital partner to dissociate quickly in order to avoid 
substantial financial harm to the entire hospital organization based upon this 
partnership agreement. Because a quick dissociation might have significant 
financial consequences for the partnership due to the debt associated with this 
new technology at the time of formation of the partnership, a reduced "buyout" 
based upon the four (4) enumerated reasons for dissociation would allow MRIA 
to continue with the hospital partner's participation and significant debt load 
issues for the partnership. The delay in payment set forth for payment in Article 
6.2 is consistent with the intent of Article 6.1 as outline above and further 
demonstrates that all of these provisions were based upon the four enumerated 
reasons for withdrawal as outlined in Article 6.1. 
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2007 R., 231 0 (emphasis added). In other words, according to Judge McLaughlin, these policy 
concerns served as both the reason why a party should only be able to "rightfully" withdraw for 
the enumerated medical-theological circumstances and why the buyout should be limited to these 
same circumstances. Id. As a result, St. AI's argument ironically serves as further proof that this 
Court's reversal of Judge McLaughlin's decision on dissociation is also inherently a reversal as 
to his decision on the buyout. 
In short, St. AI's cannot pick up one end of the stick without picking up the other. By 
convincing this Court that it could "rightfully" dissociate for reasons other than those 
enumerated in Article 6.1, it was also implicitly admitting that the buyout therein applied to 
reasons other than those enumerated in Article 6.1. And given that St. AI's does not dispute that 
the correct amount of the buyout, if it were to be applied, should be $863,040, this Court should 
reverse Judge Wetherell's decision awarding St. AI's $4.6 million, and remand with instructions 
that St. AI's be awarded $863,040 instead. 
II. ST. AL'S ARGUMENTS RELATED TO INTEREST ARE ERRONEOUS. 
A. St. AI's Pre-Judgment Interest Arguments Are Difficult to Follow. 
St. AI's next discusses the issue of interest. Cross-Respondents' Brief at 5-10. It starts 
its arguments off with an odd exchange in which it reiterates a surprisingly underdeveloped 
argument from its original Appellants' Brief that ~-judgment interest should be awarded as of 
2004, and then in a footnote tries suggest that MRIA has "implicitly conceded" an argument 
concerning this interest. Id at 5. MRIA has done no such thing-a fact which becomes obvious 
once the extraordinarily confusing phraseology of that footnote is accounted for. St. AI's 
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statement that it would be "entitled to accrued interest if [it] were awarded statutory interest" 
from 2004 pursuant to RUPA is a redundancy in terms: of course a party who is awarded 
interest would then be entitled to interest, in the same way that someone handed a banana will 
then have a banana. The problem is that St. AI's is not entitled to any accrued "statutory 
interest" in the first place, for reasons MRIA has repeatedly made clear, including the law-of-the-
case doctrine and the fact that the Partnership Agreement specifically disallows interest. See 
Respondents' Brief at 80-81; R., 3314-23; see also R., 4701-02; Ex. 4023 at § 6.2. 
As to the latter argument, MRIA argued both below and during this appeals process that 
the contract between the parties unambiguously states that St. AI's departing share is to be 
"without interest." Id. St. AI's has never articulated a legitimate argument why this binding 
contractual language should be ignored. As to the former argument-that St. AI's argument is 
barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine-MRIA argued below that when Judge McLaughlin 
awarded St. AI's its departing partner share, he did so without awarding interest. See R., 3316-
18; 2007 R., 2306-13. Critically, MRIA also proved that St. AI's did not appeal Judge 
McLaughlin's choice not to award interest. Id. Moreover, unlike Judge McLaughlin's decision 
concerning the buyout amount, this Court's SADC decision did not even arguably disturb this 
finding. As such, MRIA argued below that St. AI's arguments related to prejudgment interest 
from RUP A were barred by its failure to appeal this issue previously. Id.; see also Bouten Canst. 
v. HF Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 762, 992 P.2d 751 (1999) ("since the issue was not raised 
... to the Court of Appeals on the first appeal, it will not be considered by this Court. "). 
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In short, MRIA has challenged St. AI's attempts to obtain prejudgment interest at every 
turn. Any intimation that this issue has been conceded is little more than wishful thinking. I 
Indeed, the reasons that MRIA posited below for why St. AI's should not receive prejudgment 
interest, and the reason Judge Wetherell refused to grant prejudgment interest, are entirely solid, 
and should be upheld. 
B. St. AI's Interest Arguments Ignore the Plain Language of Idaho Statutes. 
St. AI's mostly ignores the two main arguments presented by MRIA in its Cross-
Appellants' Brief as to why the prior judgment was vacated. As a reminder, the first of those 
arguments is that this Court's findings as to Article 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement also 
implicitly reversed the departing-partner judgment in favor of S1. AI's, as discussed above. 
Assuming that is true, St. AI's would not be entitled to any interest, because it would never have 
had (and even today would not have) an accurate judgment upon which to base post-judgment 
interest. Critically, St. AI's does not contest in its Cross-Respondents' Brief that ifMRIA is 
correct as to this contention, St. AI's would have no claim to any interest. 
Second, St. AI's only nominally deals with the fact that when this Court remanded this 
matter in 2009, it stated it was "vacat[ing] the judgment"-not part of the judgment, but the 
I To the extent that St. AI's means to implicate any issues related to offset with this strangely-
worded footnote, MRIA notes that all of its arguments as to the order of the offset and interest, as 
described below, would apply regardless of when interest began to accrue. Indeed, this would be 
especially true in the context of pre-judgment interest, since even the cases cited in S1. AI's 
Cross-Respondents' Brief make clear that the widely-accepted rule is "interest on the balance"-
i.e., offsetting and then applying interest-when, as here, the pre-judgment interest and the 
offsetting judgment relate to the same subject matter. Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 87 
F.3d 614,619 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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entire judgment. SADC, 224 P.3d at 1090. Obviously, if there is no judgment, there can 
logically be no post-judgment interest. St. AI's again drops a footnote to deal with this thorny 
issue, and therein half-heartedly contends that other jurisdictions have sometimes granted 
retroactive interest on judgments which are vacated and then reinstated. Cross-Respondents' 
Brief at 8. The problem with the cases cited by St. AI's is that none of them deal with Idaho 
Code § 28-22-104, in which the Idaho legislature specifically stated that a judgment was 
necessary for post-judgment interest: "The legal rate of interest on money due on the iudgment 
of any competent court ... " (emphasis added). Indeed, both federal cases in St. AI's footnote are 
by their very language based on FED. R. ApP. P. 37, a rule which explicitly allows for the 
possibility of post-judgment interest even when a judgment is reversed: "If the court modifies or 
reverses a judgment with a direction that a money judgment be entered in the district court, the 
mandate must contain instructions about the allowance of interest." (Emphasis added.) See also, 
Indu Craft, 87 F.3d at 620-21 ("This [Federal] rule [37(b)] 'gives appellate courts discretion to 
decide the issue on a case-by-case basis.' "); DeLong Equip. v. Wash. Mills Electro Minerals, 997 
F.2d 1340, 1341-42 (llth Cir. 1993) (explaining that the power to award interest to a reinstated 
judgment comes from Rule 37). Critically, Idaho does not have an analogous provision in its 
Appellate Rules? Similarly, the California case cited by St. AI's does not deal with how its 
holding can be squared with a statute like I.e. § 28-22-104. See generally Munoz v. City of 
Union City, 173 Cal. App. 4th 199 (2009). 
2 Or at least MRIA has been unable to locate one, and MRIA assumes that if St. AI's could have 
found one itself, it would have brought it to this Court's attention. 
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As such, St. AI's is asking this Court to do nothing less than read language into 
I.C. § 28-22-104 which simply does not exist, and is doing so based mostly on federal cases 
which were interpreting a rule which specifically allowed the courts involved to award interest 
on vacated judgments. Indeed, if anything, the acknowledgement in the federal cases St. AI's 
cites-Indu Craft and DeLong Equip.-that the authority for retroactive interest explicitly came 
from FED. R. ApP. P. 37 demonstrates what would need to exist in Idaho statutes or rules in order 
for this Court to rule as St. AI's urges, but what Idaho clearly lacks. And short of the language 
found in that rule, this Court cannot simply append non-existent exceptions into Idaho statutes 
because St. AI's thinks the legislature got it wrong. See, e.g., j\1artin v. State Farm Mut., 138 
Idaho 244, 247, 61 P.3d 601 (2002) ("A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that ... courts 
are constrained to follow [a statute's] plain meaning, and neither add to the statute nor take away 
by judicial construction."). 
C. Sltould Interest Be Awarded to St. AI's, tltis Court Sltould Require an Offset 
First. 
St. AI's next argues that it would work a "manifest injustice" to it if this Court ordered 
that the setoff should be effectuated and then the interest applied. Cross-Respondents' Brief at 8. 
This statement is legally incorrect and, more than that, demonstrates an incredible amount of 
tone-deafness. As to the former, as MRIA pointed out in its Cross-Appeal, the offset is by 
definition proof positive that St. AI's was never entitled to the gross amount to begin with. See 
Yim K. Cheung v. Wing Ki Wu, 955 A.2d 746, 747 (Me. 2008) (claims "must be subtracted 
before interest is applied. Otherwise, the plaintiff would collect interest on the part of the 
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judgment the court has determined should not be awarded to him or her."). And obviously, it 
could hardly be an "injustice" for St. AI's to be denied interest on money that it was never 
entitled to in the first place. As to the latter, it is worth remembering that St. AI's is the party 
who has twice been found to have betrayed its partners so that it could secretly line its own 
pockets with ill-gotten gains. The idea that any decision related to the interest on its departing 
share related to that same partnership could at this point work a "manifest injustice" on St. Ai's 
is absurd on its face. 
St. AI's next argues that this Court should ignore cases like Thomas & Betts v. A & A 
A1echanical, 2008 WL 2696877 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008), in favor of others which St. AI's argues are 
more analogous here. Yet the cases St. AI's has chosen are so factually disparate from the matter 
at hand that their usefulness is minimal. For example, St. AI's cites Wm. R. Clarke Co. v. Safeco 
Ins., 78 Cal. App. 4th 355 (2000). But that case, by its very language, was based on a California 
statute which appears to compel interest being applied first: "Clarke's analysis is supported by 
section 695.220 which provides, as relevant, that' [m ]oney received in satisfaction of a money 
judgment. . .is to be credited ... against the accrued interest that remains unsatisfied,' and it is only 
the 'remaining money' that can then be 'credited against the principal amount of the 
judgment. .. '" Id. at 360. No such similarly worded statute exists in this case. 
But perhaps more important is the fact that, unlike the case at bar, the offset in Clarke 
was a result of an insurance company waiting for some time to bring up its offsetting rights 
because in order to do so, it would have had to have taken contradictory positions before the 
court, and it wanted to see whether its first position would result in a better outcome. Id. at 
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357-60. This irked the Court so much that said it was issuing its decision as a quasi-punishment 
for the insurer's failure to act in good faith: "we agree with the trial court that the manner in 
which Safeco exercised its right to an offset was not equitable. It follows that we find no abuse 
of discretion by the trial court [applying interest before the offset]." Id at 361. 
The other case discussed by St. AI's, Cardin ell v. Allstate Insurance, 302 A.D.2d 772, 
773 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003), is similar. In Cardinell, like Clarke, the case turned on the intent 
and language of a statute which has no application here-one which once again was meant to 
compel insurers to pay valid claims in a timely manner. Indeed, the Cardinell Court, just as the 
Clarke Court, expressed obvious agitation that the insurer had waited so long to pay its claim. 
Id. As a result, it found that interest should be applied before the offset so as to act as a 
"punitive" measure: 
In our view, both the language ofInsurance Law § 5106 (a) and 11 NYCRR 65.15 
(h) (1) and the underlying rationale behind same compel the conclusion that 
Supreme Court appropriately applied the setoff after calculating interest. First, 
under the express terms of the statute, the failure to pay benefits within 30 days 
renders benefits "overdue" and all overdue payments incur interest at the rate of 
2% per month .... More importantly ... the statute and regulation are punitive, 
with severe penalties, to encourage prompt adjustments of claims. Here, applying 
the setoff before calculating interest, thereby eliminating any recovery whatsoever 
to plaintiff, would frustrate this essential purpose. 
Id at 773-74 (internal quotations and citations omitted; emphasis added). 
As is obvious, neither the facts nor the law at issue in either Clarke or Cardinell are 
extant here. Unlike these two cases, the case at hand involves no statute mandating that the 
offset take place after the interest accrued. Moreover, none of the underlying policy questions at 
issue in Clarke and Cardinell are relevant here, both of which revolved around punishing 
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insurance companies for bad faith payment of claims. In sum, neither case is particularly 
instructive here. 
To the contrary, the case most similar by far to the one at hand is Thomas & Betts. As 
explained in detail in MRIA's Cross-Appellants' Brief, that case is extraordinarily similar to the 
one at hand, in that it: (1) involved an appeal; (2) involved a remand; (3) involved the same two 
parties; (4) involved a re-trial; and (5) involved two judgments based on the same nucleus of 
common fact, rendered several years apart due only to the fact of the appeal. Conversely, neither 
of the two cases made the centerpiece of St. AI's Cross-Respondents' Brief come anywhere close 
to this. Specifically: (1) neither Clarke nor Cardinell involved an appeal that resulted in a 
remand; (2) the judgments in Clarke were not even between the same two parties; (3) neither 
Clarke nor Cardinell involved a re-trial; and (4) in neither Clarke nor Cardinell were there 
judgments separated by a large amount of time due to an appeal. 
Of course, St. AI's makes some perfunctory efforts to distinguish Thomas & Betts 
factually from the case at hand. Yet its explanation for that case is confusing at best. In 
particular, St. AI's argues that the case at hand is different than Thomas & Betts, since MRIA did 
not prove its "legal entitlement to any money until" the second trial. Cross-Respondents' Brief 
at 10. This is misleading: MRIA proved a legal entitlement in the first trial, and obtained an 
offset in 2007, but the resulting judgment was reversed due to errors by the trial court. This is 
critical, since as Thomas & Betts makes clear, it is a "well-established legal principle that a 
judgment entered after remand should place each party in the position it would have been in had 
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the trial court's original action been correct." fd at * *2-3. St. AI's attempts at distinguishing this 
highly germane case accordingly fail. 
III. THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT IS FOR A TERM OR PARTICULAR UNDERTAKING. 
St. AI's next addresses MRIA's arguments related to the partnership being for a term or 
particular undertaking. Cross-Respondents' Brief at 10-18. In essence, St. AI's asks this Court 
to look at certain provisions of the Partnership Agreement in a vacuum rather than interpreting it 
as a whole in light of all of its provisions. Based on this myopic view of the Agreement, St. AI's 
insists that it unambiguously provides that the term ofthe partnership is indefinite. St. AI's 
argument fails. The agreement is not unambiguously indefinite. 
This Court has stated that when determining the meaning of a contract, it must view the 
contract as a whole. Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 735, 9 P.3d 534, 
538 (2000). It has also stated that to determine whether a contract is ambiguous, it must 
determine whether the terms of that contract are reasonably susceptible to conflicting 
interpretations. City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,201, 899 P.2d 411,414 
(1995). Here, the Partnership Agreement is at least ambiguous as to the duration of the 
partnership and whether the partnership was formed for a particular undertaking3 because the 
provisions of the Agreement addressing this topic are reasonably susceptible to conflicting 
3 In this instance the term of the partnership and the undertaking are interrelated. As set forth in 
MRIA's Cross-Appellants' Brief, the undertaking is the management of the limited partnership, 
which has an express term. 
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interpretations. Therefore, the interpretation of the Agreement was a question of fact that should 
have been presented to the jury. Campagna v. Parker, 116 Idaho 734, 737, 779 P.2d 409 (1989). 
As set forth in MRIA' s Cross-Appellants' Brief, at issue is the interplay of several 
sections of the Partnership Agreement. To recap, the expressly-stated purpose of the MRIA 
partnership was to "organize and promote an Idaho limited partnership" and to operate and 
manage medical diagnostic devices, including a magnetic resonance imaging device. Ex. 4023 at 
§ 1.6.4 The Agreement further provides that when formed, the limited partnership(s) shall have 
the same purpose as MRIA.5 Id. Article 1.1, which is entitled "Effective Date and Term," 
provides in subarticle 1.1.1 that if the limited partnerships are not formed by December 31,1985, 
MRIA will end on that date. In turn, subarticle 1.1.2 provides that if the limited partnerships are 
formed, MRIA shall end when the "business of the partnership" is completed. 
As St. AI's admits, the key phrase is the "business of the partnership." That phrase is not 
expressly defined in the Partnership Agreement. Indeed, there is a question of fact as to the 
4 Article 1.6, which concerns the purpose of the partnership, is itself ambiguous. St. AI's, in its 
Cross-Respondents' Brief, only cites one of the three paragraphs in the Article. The first 
paragraph makes clear that the purpose of the partnership is, among other things, to acquire and 
operate imaging devices. Id. The second paragraph, which St. AI's conveniently overlooks, 
provides that the partnership will "promote and organize an Idaho Limited Partnership" to 
engage in the purpose described in the first paragraph-acquire and operate imaging devices. Id. 
At a minimum, the interrelation between paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1.6 create an ambiguity as 
to whether the purpose of the partnership is to own and operate imaging devices on its own or to 
do so through a limited partnership. 
5 In furtherance of that purpose, a magnetic resonance imaging device was acquired and placed 
on SARMC's campus. Ex. 4021. The device was owned and operated by MRICI, the limited 
partner contemplated by the agreement. Tr. 171 :6-24; Ex. 5027. MRIA managed the business 
and affairs ofMRICI and later MRIM. Tr. 171 :6-24. 
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meaning of that phrase within the context of the partnership. This question of fact is 
demonstrated by the parties' disagreement as to the meaning of the phrase. 
St. AI's contends that the phrase does not refer to the management of the limited 
partnerships but instead refers to the MRIA partnership itself. The problem with St. AI's circular 
argument is that it does not answer the question as to what that business is. In that regard, St. 
AI's ignores that the business of MRIA is the management of the limited partnership. This is 
made clear by the fact that Article 1.1.1 provides that if the limited partnership contemplated by 
the Partnership Agreement was not formed by December 31, 1985, the MRIA partnership would 
end on that date. Likewise, Article 1.6 provides that the "Partnership intends to promote and 
organize an Idaho limited partnership ... [that shall have] the same purpose as this Partnership." 
Id at § 1.6. 
Thus, keeping in mind that the Partnership Agreement must be read as a whole, the 
"business of the partnership" phrase used in Article 1.1.2 must be read in light of Articles 1.1.1 
and 1.6. Those two articles express the intent that the business of the partnership is the 
management of the limited partnership formed pursuant to the Partnership Agreement. If that 
were not the case, why would the partnership end if the limited partnership was not formed by 
December 31, 19857 The only answer is that the MRIA partnership, pursuant to the terms of the 
Partnership Agreement, is inextricably intertwined with the limited partnership referenced in the 
Agreement. Accordingly, although the phrase "the business of the partnership" is not defined in 
the Agreement, Article 1.1.2, when read in conjunction with Articles 1.1.1 and 1.6, elucidate that 
the "business of the partnership" is the management of the limited partnership. 
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Consequently, it is at least ambiguous as to whether the MRlA partnership's term is 
coexistent with the limited partnership. Where Article 1.1.1 provides a date certain on which the 
partnership will end if the limited partnership is not formed, Article 1.1.2 sets forth the date on 
which the partnership will end if the limited partnership is formed. It provides in relevant part 
that "[i]f the Limited Partnership contemplated by Article 1.6 is formed and the limited 
partnership interests sold ... on or before December 31, 1985, then the term of this Partnership 
shall end on the date which is within a reasonable time after the business of the Partnership is 
wound up and dissolved under Article 10." That is, if the limited partnership is formed, the 
partnership will not terminate on December 31, 1985, but will terminate when the "business of 
the Partnership" is wound up and dissolved under Article 10. Since there is at least a question of 
fact as to whether the "business of the Partnership" is the management of the limited 
partnerships, there is also a question of fact as to whether the duration of the Partnership is 
coextensive with the duration ofthe limited partnerships. In other words, because MRIA's 
purpose under the Agreement is to manage the affairs of the limited partnerships, and because 
the limited partnerships have an expiration date,6 the business of the MRlA partnership ends 
when its undertaking-managing the limited partnerships--ends. 7 
6 St. AI's has not disputed that the limited partnerships have express termination dates. 
7 St. AI's argues that the term is not definite because MRlA manages more than one limited 
partnership. S1. AI's, however, disregards that although each limited partnership is a separate 
undertaking, that does not mean that the partnership will not end when the undertakings are 
completed. Indeed, S1. AI's has not cited to any case law stating that there cannot be more than 
one undertaking. Moreover, the law does not require that the undertaking "must be capable of 
accomplishment at some [definite] time." Girard Bankv. Haley, 460 Pa. 237, 332 A.2d 443, 447 
(1975). Although the exact date of accomplishment need not be specified or even ascertainable 
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Moreover, St. AI's disregards the extrinsic evidence supporting MRIA' s position 
because, according to S1. AI's, the Partnership Agreement is an integrated contract. At the 
outset, it should be noted that the Partnership Agreement does not contain an integration clause. 
And regardless, this Court has held that extrinsic evidence may be considered to interpret 
ambiguous provisions of a contract. Dr. James Cool, D.D.S v. Mountainview Landowners Co-
op., 139 Idaho 770, 773,86 P.3d 484 (2004). In that regard, this Court has noted that when 
determining the parties' intent, the Court considers not only the contract as a whole, but also "the 
circumstances under which it was made, the objective and purpose of the particular provision, 
and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct or 
dealings." Triad Leasing & Fin. v. Rocky Mountain Rogues, 148 Idaho 503,513,224 P.3d 1092 
(2009). Furthermore, other courts have recognized that "in the absence of an express term in a 
contract fixing a duration, a court may inquire into the intent of the parties." Hooker Chemicals 
& Plastics v. International Minerals & Chern., 456 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
Therefore, because the "business ofthe Partnership" is, at worst for MRIA, not clearly 
defined by the agreement, nor is there an express provision fixing the duration of the partnership, 
extrinsic evidence may be considered. Consequently, the fact that the attorney for St. AI's that 
drafted the agreement ~Tote to the parties stating that they need not worry about the absence of a 
"sunset clause" because "the life of this [MRIA] partnership will undoubtedly be determined by 
the terms of the lease and the limited partnership" demonstrates that the term of the partnership is 
at formation, some date for accomplishment must be conceivable. Id. Here it is conceivable that 
the partnership will end when its businesses, which have fixed durations, end. 
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the term ofthe limited partnerships. Ex. 12 at 2 (emphasis added). The same is true of the fact 
that on October 11, 1999, St. AI's board of directors met and discussed the MRIA partnership 
and agreed to "[e]xtend[] the term of the MRI partnership agreement to 12/31/23." Trial Ex. 
4109 at 1 (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the reference to Article lOin Article 1.1.2 does not make the term 
indefinite. As found in Congel v. Maljitano, 877 N.Y.S.2d 443, 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), the 
partnership agreement has a definite term because "[w]hile the partnership agreement does not 
specify a time limit, the parties nevertheless expressed their intention that the duration of the 
partnership was to be limited by providing that it shall dissolve upon an election of a majority of 
the partners." Thus, rather than creating an indefinite term, Article 10 creates a definite term in 
that the partnership will terminate upon the completion of the business of the partnership and a 
vote of the partners. 
Article 10 also creates an ambiguity because Article 10.1, itself, is ambiguous. As set 
forth in MRIA's Cross-Appellants' Brief, Article 10.1 could be interpreted to be a provision for 
the parties to use to end the partnership before the end of the term, with the understanding that 
without that vote it would otherwise last for the term set out in Articles 1.1.2 and 1.6 (the term of 
the limited partnership). Alternatively, the reference to Article 10 could simply mean that as part 
of the winding up process, the partners needed to perfunctorily join together and affirm that the 
term of the partnership had ended. These interpretations, unlike St. AI's construction, do not 
ignore the term language in Articles 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.6. 
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Given that these interpretations are reasonable, the trial court's finding that its 
interpretation that the duration of the partnership is indefinite is the only possible interpretation is 
error. Reasonable minds could differ on whether the partnership was for a term (or an 
undertaking) and therefore, the issue should have been presented to the jury. Consequently, the 
trial court's decision to decide this issue as a matter of law must be reversed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST MRIA'S CLAIM THAT ST. AL'S WITHDRAWAL BREACHED THE 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT. 
The jury should have been permitted to hear MRIA's common-law claim that S1. AI's 
breached the Partnership Agreement when it withdrew from the MRIA partnership. Contrary to 
St. Ai's assertion otherwise, the Supreme Court did not reject this claim on the previous appeal. 
Rather, the Supreme Court's decision was aimed exclusively at a statutory claim that does not 
preclude a common-law theory of liability. 
As discussed above, Article 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement provides a handful of 
enumerated medical-theological circumstances related to withdrawal. In the previous trial of this 
action, MRIA asserted that St. Ai's was in violation ofthe RUPA provision I.C. § 53-3-602, 
making wrongful the breach of an "express" provision of the partnership agreement, because 
S1. AI's had withdrawn for a reason other the one of the enumerated circumstances. During the 
first appeal, this Court asked whether Article 6.1 was an "express" provision, remarking: 
Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b)(1) provides that a dissociation is wrongful if it is "in 
breach of an express provision of the partnership agreement." The statute does not 
simply provide that dissociation is wrongful if it is in breach of the partnership 
agreement, or if it is in breach of a provision in the partnership agreement. It is 
only wrongful if it breaches an express provision of the partnership agreement. 
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SADC, 224 P.3d at 1077 (some emphasis added). Noting that Article 6.1 was subject to multiple 
interpretations and did not expressly limit withdrawal to the enumerated medical-theological 
circumstances, the Supreme Court held that this did not constitute wrongful withdrawal under 
RUPA's I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(1). 
Significantly, in noting that "the statute does not simply provide that dissociation is 
wrongful ifit is in breach of the partnership agreement," the Supreme Court was careful to 
distinguish between statutory violations of RUP A, and common-law contractual violations. The 
Supreme Court was not asked to, and did not, hold that St. AI's withdrawal was in conformity 
with the contract, but merely that Article 6.1 was not sufficiently "express" that violation thereof 
could violate RUP A. Significantly, the Supreme Court did not rule on the ultimate meaning of 
Article 6.1, but merely noted that it was ambiguous and subject to several different 
interpretations, 148 Idaho 486-87, thus putting the ultimate meaning of Article 6.1 squarely into 
ajury's hands. See Afton Energy, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 122 Idaho 333, 340-41, 834 P.2d 
850, 857-58 (1992) (if an agreement or contract is ambiguous, the resolution of any ambiguity 
raises a question of fact for the jury). 
The district court incorrectly removed MRIA's common-law breach of contract claim 
from the jury's hands when it held that RUPA displaced the common law. Essentially, the 
district court ruled that there could never be a breach of the language of the partnership 
agreement directed at dissociation if there was any ambiguity or lack of exact specificity in the 
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term, because under such circumstances that term of the partnership agreement could never 
qualify as "express" under RUPA. 
This is not, as St. AI's asserts, a "word game," based on the wrongs "withdrawal" and 
"dissociation." MRIA does not hinge its argument on the meaning of any particular word in 
RUP A. Rather, it is simply noting that this Court has repeatedly held that such displacement of 
common law requires specific legislative intent, as shown by explicit language within the statute 
which expressly states that it is abrogating the common law. See, e.g., Chenery v. Agri-Lines, 
115 Idaho 281, 285, 766 P.2d 751, 755 (1988); Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594,607,151 P.2d 
765 (1944); Cox v. Sf. Anthony Bank & Trust, 41 Idaho 776, 242 P. 785, 786 (1925). In this 
regard, St. AI's argues that RUP A "necessarily displaced" the common law because it created a 
right to withdraw where none existed before. Yet this is not even remotely the test for abrogation 
of the cornmon law. Significantly, contrary to St. AI's argument, the common law and statutory 
law can and do sit neatly together, as RUP A expressly provides that it exists "in addition to any 
other obligation of the partner to the partnership or to other partners." I.C. § 53-3-602(c). 
Indeed, St. AI's interpretation of RUP A would render Article 6.1, and any other 
ambiguous provision of a partnership agreement directed at dissociation, completely meaningless 
and unenforceable. The legislature has never indicated any intent that RUP A should entirely 
displace the cornmon law. Put another way, that Article 6.1 was not sufficiently express to put it 
under the purview of RUPA's I.C. § 53-3-602(b)(1) does not simply make this provision 
disappear. A jury should have been permitted to work out which of the interpretations 
highlighted by the Supreme Court was the correct interpretation, and then to determine whether 
CROSS-APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 21 
St. AI's withdrawal from the MRIA partnership constituted a common-law violation of the 
partnership agreement. 
V. THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CONSIDER MRIA'S 
DAMAGE CLAIMS RELATED TO IMI EAGLE. 
St. AI's makes several arguments in support of withholding evidence of damages related 
to IMI Eagle from the jury. None ofthose arguments is persuasive. 
A. MRIA Should Have Been Allowed to Claim Eagle-Related Damages Because 
St. AI's Usurped MRIA 's Opportunity to Partner with IMl in Eagle. 
S1. AI's addresses MRIA's first Eagle argument last-that MRIA would have went with 
IMI to Eagle but for St. AI's usurpation ofMRIA's opportunity to partner with IMI-in apparent 
hopes of minimizing its importance. Critically, in its brief, St. AI's does not dispute the evidence 
submitted by MRIA that St. AI's usurped MRIA's opportunity to partner with IMI, nor did it 
submit contrary evidence. Instead, S1. AI's erroneously argues that MRIA "offered no evidence 
to suggest that, in the but-for world where MRIA would partner with IMI, this hypothetical new 
partnership would have opened an Eagle facility." Cross-Respondents' Brief at 26. Contrary to 
St. AI's argument, there is substantial evidence that the partnership would have opened a facility 
in Eagle. Undeniably, the best evidence of this is the undisputed fact that IMI did indeed open a 
facility in Eagle. Tr., 4551 :25-4553:8; Ex. 5089. Additionally, there is strong evidence that 
MRIA also desired to open a facility in Eagle. Tr.,3908:5-3910:16. Such evidence is more than 
sufficient for a jury to conclude that but for S1. AI's usurpation ofMRIA's opportunity to partner 
with IMI, MRIA would have gone with IMI to Eagle. 
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While St. AI's, for obvious reasons, paid short shrift to the above argument, it instead 
focused its first argument on its flawed contention that MRIA's Eagle opportunity was not 
usurped because MRIA never tried to go into the Eagle market. Cross-Respondents' Brief at 23. 
Yet this argument ignores that the analysis is not whether MRIA was actually on the brink of 
opening an Eagle facility, but rather, whether an Eagle MRI facility was within the scope of 
MRIA's business. See Lifshutz v. Lifshutz, 199 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006); 
Harestad v. Weitzel, 242 Or. 199, 536 P.2d 522 (1975). It is undisputed that having an MRI 
center in Eagle was within the line of MRIA' s business, and one that it had actually discussed 
with St. Ai's. Tr.,3905:5-3910:16. 
Indeed, S1. AI's also ignores the fact that it was S1. AI's that prevented MRIA from 
expanding into both Eagle and Meridian until it was too late for MRIA to do so. There was not 
only substantial, but undisputed, evidence that S1. AI's strongly opposed the growth ofMRI 
Mobile (Tr., 1485: 12-1489:7,2073:20-2075:23,3916:7-3919:5; Ex. 4221 at 2-4), the entity that 
would have pursued the Meridian and Eagle opportunities. Tr.,3908:2l-25. At an MRIA board 
meeting that occurred shortly after Mobile had requested to pursue opportunities in Meridian, 
Eagle, and with Treasure Valley Hospital, S1. AI's COO, Cindy Schamp, stated in response to a 
question concerning whether S1. AI's was opposed to the growth of Mobile, that S1. Ai's "is not 
interested in perpetuating the growth ofMRI Mobile. It is not consistent with what [S1. Ai's] is 
trying to achieve with their ten year growth plan." Ex. 4221 at 3-4. Now, having usurped the 
opportunity, S1. AI's claims it never prevented MRIA from going to Eagle because it only had 
two of 10 votes. Cross-Respondents' Brief at 23. But S1. AI's ignores the undisputed evidence 
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that, while only having two votes, St. AI's knew it had the practical ability to control the 
partnership because MRIA had told it that it would not undertake any action that its partner, 
St. AI's, opposed. Tr., 198:2-201:22 (Dr. Prochaska tells Ms. Bruce, "Sandy, we always do what 
the CEOs want. All you have to do .. .is tell the board what you want."), 182:11-183:4,3905:5-
3917:2.8 In fact, MRIA was not passive as St. AI's suggests. Instead, it was heeding the wishes 
of its partner, St. AI's, and by the time St. AI's withdrew and MRIA was free to allow Mobile to 
expand into areas like Eagle and Meridian, it was no longer in a position to be able to pursue 
those opportunities due to St. AI's breaches of fiduciary duty. See MRIA's Respondents' Brief 
at Part LA.l.b & Part I.B. Thus, there is substantial evidence that St. AI's usurped MRIA's 
opportunity in Eagle. 
B. The Eagle-Related Damages Are Not Too Remote Because They Were 
Siphoned From Meridian. 
St. AI's argues that the fact that Eagle profits were siphoned from the Meridian profits is 
an "entirely new justification" for Eagle profits. This is not true. Evidence was presented at trial 
through MRIA' s expert that once IMI's Eagle operation opened in 2007, IMI's business at 
MeridianiMagicview was reduced by half while the Eagle location picked up approximately the 
amount of business lost by the Meridian location. Ex. 5067. There was also evidence of the 
reason for this-that IMI Meridian started with two magnets, but that when IMI Eagle opened, 
one of those magnets was moved to Eagle. Tr.,4549:24-4550:23. From this evidence, the jury 
8 A great example of this deference to St. AI's is demonstrated by Mobile's request to do work 
for Treasure Valley Hospital. St. AI's opposed this work because Treasure Valley Hospital 
competed with St. AI's and because St. AI's opposed the work, Mobile did not pursue the 
opportunity. Ex. 4221 at 2-5; Tr. 3913:19-3917:20. 
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easily could have inferred that Eagle's profits were nothing more than Meridian profits in a new 
location. In short, this argument is not new, but was presented below through expert evidence. 
St. Ai's also argues that the theory is unsound because "it is not supported by citation to 
any factual or expert testimony." Cross-Respondents' Brief at 25. This is false. As cited above, 
the theory was presented through unrebutted factual evidence from an expert. MRIA's expert, 
Bruce Budge, analyzed the profits of Meridian and Eagle and his Exhibit 5067 shows that as IMI 
Eagle was opened, it gained profits in the approximate amount that IMI Meridian lost profits. 
See also Tr., 4549:24-4550:23. The jury could easily take this evidence as proof that when one 
ofIMI Meridian's two MRI magnets was moved to IMI Eagle when it opened that IMI Eagle 
simply siphoned profits from IMI Meridian. It appears that St. AI's is arguing that MRIA's 
expert should have made this conclusion for the jury, but St. AI's failed to cite to any authority 
for the proposition that an expert rather than a jury must make this conclusion from the evidence. 
Therefore, MRIA should have been allowed to claim Eagle-related damages as those 
damages are not too remote because they were simply taken from Meridian. In other words, as 
stated in MRIA's Cross-Appellants' Brief, it would be illogical to cut offthe damages related to 
the 2001 Meridian usurpation-which was found by both the jury and the trial court to have been 
unlawful-simply because IMI opened an office closer to these already-stolen patients in Eagle. 
Or, at the very least, it should have been an issue for the jury to consider. 
C. MRIA's Eagle Damages Do Not Run Afoul of Trilogy. 
St. AI's next makes the same argument it made in its Appellants' Brief with respect 
damages for Meridian-that the damages allegedly run afoul of this court's decision in Trilogy 
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Network Systems v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007). Rather than simply 
restating its response to that argument verbatim, MRIA incorporates the arguments made in its 
Respondents' Brief at 35-41, and provides a brief synopsis. In sum, Trilogy is inapposite 
because that case did not involve the taking of an opportunity to build a new facility where there 
would be a different cost structure and profit margin than any existing operations. Instead, 
Trilogy involved a situation akin to Center's claim for lost profits. Id. As MRIA's expert Budge 
explained, unlike the diverted scan calculation for Center's lost profits-which was able to draw 
from Center's preexisting cost structure and profit margins to arrive at the amount of damages-
Mobile's claim was that it was prevented from opening a facility in Eagle, but there was no 
existing Mobile facility from which to derive a comparable cost structure and profit margin. Tf., 
4545:15-4550:25,4552:25-4554:6. Consequently, the most reasonable thing to do was to 
assume, as Budge did, that Mobile would have built a center in Eagle similar to that built by IMI 
(adjusted to include only MRI services). Id. Then, rather than speculating, Budge used the costs 
actually incurred by St. AI's and GSR to build and operate a facility. Id. From another 
perspective, the most credible way to determine what profits and costs would have been realized 
by Mobile's Eagle facility is to look at the best comparable facility for which data was 
available-IMI Eagle. Thus, borrowing IMI's actual operating numbers was not "speculative," 
since, unlike in Trilogy, MRIA demonstrated a reasonable-and the best available-
correspondence between what its profit would have been and IMI's actual profit. 
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